YPG’s recent setbacks extend well beyond the Syrian theater. They may act as a catalyst for broader recalibration among Kurdish armed movements operating against the Islamic Republic –one that privileges political survivability over armed maximalism.

The Yazidi existential crisis and return dilemma continues amidst the geopolitical security burdens and the lack of efficient government-led national reconciliation.

The intra-PMF rivalries are not limited by the theological schism between Najaf and Qom’s schools of thought.

Even though the project to renovate the caravan route of the Karbala prisoners is ostensibly for religious purposes, it also possesses political, economic, and perhaps expansionist objectives.

Beyond Iraq’s economic woes, the Biden administration’s obstacles include Iran and its backed militias, the repercussions of the withdrawal of US troops, and ISIS’ re-emergence.

The military-political positioning of the Shrine Militia so far and their secession seem to reflect Ayatollah al-Sistani’s vision.

Russian media attacks on Assad could be considered as an indication of the distrust of Moscow towards the regime. But these attacks do not mean that Putin would stop supporting Assad in the near future.

President Saleh appointed US returned Adnan al Zurfi as prime minister after parties failed to reach consensus.

From Ankara’s perspective, Iranian cooperation in operations against the PKK is key and Turkey’s determination to work with Tehran to strangle the Kurdish group is on display.

Evidently, both Assad and Iran’s Supreme Leader sought to exploit Assad’s visit to convey an indubitable message, which is “the success of the axis of resistance” in Syria.

It is possible to say that the US has never had an impressive strategy towards the Kurds, which are scattered in four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

The recent developments in Northern Iraq and Kirkuk have once again brought Iran’s role in the region and its relations with Turkey to the agenda.