With the outbreak of the war on February 28, the nuclear issue has been absorbed into a far broader bargaining environment in which longstanding disputes over sanctions, ballistic missiles, regional influence, and entrenched mutual distrust now intersect with a new set of geopolitical frictions generated by the war itself.

The course of the war reveals a fundamental paradox: while none of the principal actors appears capable of achieving a decisive victory, all retain sufficient capacity to obstruct a stable resolution.

While limited and transactional cooperation mechanisms may emerge between Tehran and Riyadh, a deeper and more enduring strategic alignment between the two countries remains improbable in the near term.

China and Russia, the influential powers in the SCO, have abandoned their reservations in their relations with Iran in recent years and established a more comprehensive relationship.

The fact that Mahsa Amini, who lived in the Kurdistan province, was visiting Tehran at the time of her death caused the protests to be particularly intense in Iran’s predominantly Kurdish areas.

Iran’s protectionist behaviour in foreign trade to protect the domestic market created problems in the trade of many products within the scope of the PTA.

Jinping's visit to Riyadh will strengthen the hand of those who criticize the Look to the East policy in Iran, which considers China an absolute ally within the scope of this policy since 2018.

The Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Deal has been a trigger that started the new phase of the dashing energy policies of the countries in the region.