Summary

• The increasing power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has, over time, led to conflicts of authority and lack of coordination by establishing dominance over other institutions. There are debates regarding conflicts of authority and usurpation of power between IRGC and numerous institutions such as the Ministry of Intelligence, Army (Artesh), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Interior.
• The process of “political purging” and the loss of balancing political figures have increased inter-institutional conflicts.
• Social unrest and economic difficulties are overburdening internal intelligence units and weakening defense mechanisms against external threats.
• Economic hardships are making Iranian citizens targets for foreign intelligence services which in turn increases the risk of collaboration with foreigners within the country.
• The increase in smuggling activities and weakening of border security facilitate the entry of materials that can be used against the country. This provides operational space for terrorist organizations and hostile intelligence agencies.
• Economic and psychological pressure on intelligence personnel is threatening institutional integrity and reducing the quality of intelligence.
• The fear society has towards intelligence institutions is making information sharing difficult and hinder the detection of internal threats.
• The tendency of state employees to display their status is jeopardizing operational security.
• Internal conflicts and security vulnerabilities are facilitating Israel's covert activities.
• Addressing these vulnerabilities requires comprehensive reforms, but a solution in the short term seems difficult due to current structural problems and external pressures.

     1. Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been experiencing assassinations, attacks, and sabotage since the Revolution. While these attacks were initially in the form of actions by anti-system terrorist groups, this situation has changed since 2010. From this date onwards, along with terrorist attacks, activities systematically carried out directly by another state have also begun to be observed. The attacks on the Parliament and the complex housing Ayatollah Khomeini's tomb in Tehran in 2017, the removal of highly classified nuclear documents from the country by trucks in 2018, the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Tehran on November 27, 2020, the attacks on Shah Cheragh in Shiraz on August 13, 2023, and finally the attacks during the ceremony organized for the death anniversary of Qasem Soleimani in Kerman on January 3, 2024, as well as the recent assassination of an important figure like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, have exposed a serious security vulnerability in the country.

It is known that Israel has established an extensive intelligence network in Iran and can easily conduct covert activities in Iran through this network. As seen in the examples above, this can take the form of sabotage, removal of important documents from the country, and assassinations. This report will address Israel's effectiveness in Iran and the vulnerabilities of Iranian intelligence that lead to this situation. In addition to the vulnerabilities created by inter-institutional governance problems, disconnections in state-society relations and economic problems directly affect security issues in Iran. These factors not only weaken the effectiveness of security institutions but also undermine public trust in the state. Economic difficulties reduce public welfare, increasing social unrest and triggering potential security threats. Moreover, the state's inability to meet societal demands leads to legitimacy crises. After briefly touching upon these aspects of the issue, the study will address the main points of the matter.

In the following sections, to analyze the causes of Iran's aforementioned vulnerability, we will examine how and why the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates in parallel with state institutions and is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader, has begun to experience conflicts and usurpation of authority with other institutions over time, the cultural and social points that cause security gaps, what kind of vulnerabilities it has in terms of both intelligence and public diplomacy, and at which points the complex decision-making mechanisms in Iran falter. Before proceeding with the examination, it should be noted that this study has three main limitations. The first is the limitation of analyzing Iran's institutions based solely on open-source information. The second is the great historical depth of the subject. For this reason, although it would be useful to address the transformation processes of many actors and institutions to shed light on the subject, this historical dimension has been left out to maintain the focus of the study. The third constraint is the difficulty of concisely presenting the enormous volume created by the functioning of institutions and the system. At this point, it should be noted that the report is not designed to cover everything, and the main aim is to provide, based on open sources and field observations, how the process works and where errors might occur.

Finally, it should be noted that the examples given under certain headings, especially those related to society, cannot be generalized but are mentioned here because they are frequently encountered in the field. Additionally, whether IRGC members are instrumentalizing the rising threats against Iran to derive more power and fortune for themselves stands as another question. The security gaps this would create are also evident. However, this is the subject of a broader study and will only be touched upon here.

     2. Inter-Institutional Authority Conflicts, Usurpation of Authority, and Politicization

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country that has overcome many difficulties since its establishment, including war, and has witnessed dozens of assassinations and attacks. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been unable to use his right arm for decades due to an assassination attempt he survived on June 27, 1981. The point to note here is that for a long time in Iran, the majority of such actions were carried out by terrorist groups and various opposition organizations operating within Iran, even if some were supported from abroad. Iran has responded to such terrorist acts with countermeasures such as arrests, executions, and eliminating leaders. Indeed, relevant units of Iran have carried out attacks against dozens of individuals living outside Iran who are seen as threats to the system, whether associated with terrorism or not. Even during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, Iran managed to create room for maneuver through actions carried out in Lebanon via Hezbollah against actors such as France and the USA to ensure its security.

Although Iran continued its covert activities, especially towards its neighbors, in the decade following the war, it focused on rebuilding in domestic politics and the economy, trying to compensate for the damage caused by the war. With the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997, the country entered a kind of reform and relaxation process, based on the idea that Iran was no longer the Iran of 1979 and was undergoing a social transformation. However, in addition to internal dynamics, the changing global conjuncture began to radically transform Iranian politics and society, and developments in Iran followed a different course from the second term of Khatami between 2001-2005.

In this course, the international break that occurred with the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, was an important turning point. A few months after the incident, on January 29, 2002, then-US President George Bush declared Iran as part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and North Korea, and began to encircle Iran by invading its eastern and western neighbors. As the process progressed, Iranian elites, taking into account the cooperation of Gulf countries with the USA, saw that a threat against them was rising day by day. Right at a time when Iran was in the crosshairs, in 2002, the People's Mujahideen Organization, an anti-regime opposition group, shared some files with the international community suggesting that Iran was seeking to obtain nuclear weapons. Considering that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was invaded due to allegations of developing chemical and biological weapons, Iran's situation seemed much more serious. Iranian elites, who viewed the world from a highly security-oriented perspective, turned to an even more security-oriented line after these developments, which led to a tremendous increase in the power and effectiveness of the IRGC.

After the disclosure of nuclear activities, Israel changed its view of the "threat" from Iran and began to take a more threatening stance. However, until the Stuxnet worm, developed in cooperation with the USA to disrupt Iran's nuclear work, affected Iran's nuclear facilities in Bushehr and Natanz in June 2010, Israel, which could not operate within Iran at today's level and whose activities were more limited compared to today, generally focused on intelligence gathering and pressure policies supported by diplomatic efforts. However, this does not mean that Israel could not operate at all within Iran. Considering that the development and operationalization of Stuxnet dates back to 2005, it is seen that Israel quickly decided to actively conduct covert operations within Iran and implemented this decision. Likewise, the first suspicious event where nuclear researchers were assassinated in succession occurred on January 15, 2007, when Ardeshir Hosseinpour, one of the founders of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, died suspiciously. This is another indication that Israel reacted very quickly to the threat.

It's worth making a brief detour here. In the Hosseinpour assassination, it is important that the target was neutralized without an overt and direct attack and probably as a result of a toxic assassination. We see more overt attacks on relevant targets after 2010. After the Hosseinpour incident, assassination claims were denied by Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, who said that Iranian nuclear experts were "safe and secure." However, as of 2010, Israel changed its method and evolved the assassination method to bombing attacks to create a terror effect on other names studying nuclear issues. Thus, it showed that scientists were undeniably targets for Israel. Since then, Israel has acted in a way that shows it is attacking openly, not secretly. This can be said to have the aim of forcing Iran to negotiate and the desire to forcibly accept its demands at the negotiation table.

     2.1 The IRGC's Dominance Over the System  

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been one of the most important institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran from its inception. Therefore, this report does not claim that the IRGC became effective after being an ineffective institution in the process discussed. Instead, it argues that while already an influential institution, the IRGC increased its effectiveness to the level of domination, forming a kind of parallel state. In this process, it usurped authority by overshadowing the power of institutions such as the Artesh (regular army), the Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc., resulting in the deepening of security vulnerabilities in Iran.

The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 led to significant changes in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. This development, which ended the reform winds of the Khatami era, also sowed the seeds of the social cracks that exist in Iranian society today. In this context, it should not be forgotten that modern communication opportunities and social media have increased in importance in Iranian society, as in every society, since this period, and this has been effective in the social change experienced. In foreign policy, Ahmadinejad's adoption of highly hawkish rhetoric towards Israel was another factor that further raised Israel's threat perception and prompted Western powers to stand more firmly behind Israel. During this period, Israeli officials repeatedly emphasized that they saw Iran as an irrational actor and that such an actor should definitely not reach nuclear capacity. Moreover, Israelis loudly voiced their belief that diplomatic efforts with Iran would not be beneficial in any way, just as they do today, and Israel, which does not want strong central authorities and nuclear-armed powers that could challenge it in the region, charted its course accordingly.

Iran, aware of the rising threat against it, made some changes in its military doctrine. Examining the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the IRGC announced the Mosaic Defense concept in 2005 to prevent a possible invasion against itself, dividing the country into certain sections in terms of defense and building a fragmented defense line. On the other hand, Iran took steps to deepen the Forward Defense concept and its relations with proxy power networks, thus seeking to pressure Israel in this way. As mentioned above, Iran, which saw that it could pressure France and the USA through Hezbollah during the Iran-Iraq War and strengthen its hand at the negotiating table, expanded these activities by spreading them throughout the entire region.

Iran has used the Jerusalem and Palestine issue as a military and political tool in search of legitimacy since the early years of the revolution. The Quds Force, operating under the IRGC, is Iran's most important concrete step in this direction. With the rise of threats against Iran in the 2000s, the Quds Force, under the command of Qasem Soleimani, began to play a more effective role and make its name heard more frequently by going beyond its traditional areas of authority. Establishing a network of proxy forces in the region, the Quds Force has become the most dominant pillar of the "forward defense" concept, which was voiced much more in Iran after the invasion of Iraq. While all this was happening, Iran accelerated its missile and drone development programs in an effort to develop its asymmetric capacity to increase its deterrence.

Although all these steps taken during the Ahmadinejad period initially seemed consistent and strategically productive, they actually laid the groundwork for Iran's current security and intelligence vulnerabilities. This period was a process in which both the IRGC's day-by-day increasing power began to turn into domination over other institutions, and the divisions within society turned into a break beyond division, bringing along many security vulnerabilities.

The internal turmoil known as the Green Movement, which began after Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009, escalated security concerns in Iran. The dimensions of the threat perception of the Tehran administration, which evaluated this event as a social movement provoked by hostile elements, just like the Stuxnet and Hosseinpour incidents, also expanded. The fact that these protests were called "green" at that time, similar to the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003 and the Orange Revolution that started in Ukraine in November 2004, and that the protests received serious support from abroad, supported the view among Iranian officials that this movement was an "enemy-supported activity." Regardless of whether it was supported from outside or not, the 2009 events had a great impact on the "Generation Y" segment of Iranian society in particular.

The experience of the effective power of the Basij organization, a paramilitary structure affiliated with the IRGC, in suppressing protests at that time moved the IRGC and Basij to a more active position within Iran. The start of the Arab Spring shortly after these events and the change of some administrations in the region as a result of protests further increased security policies in Iran and consolidated the power of the IRGC and Basij. In this process, the IRGC began to overtake the Police Organization and the Ministry of Interior and to usurp certain powers of these institutions.

In 2010, overt attacks against Iranian scientists began to intensify, and between 2010 and 2012, a series of important figures were killed by bombs attached to their vehicles by an approaching motorcycle while they were in motion. These chain assassinations, which began in January 2010 while the effects of the 2009 protests had not yet passed, brought about questioning about internal security. On the other hand, with the Arab Spring, Iran's already rising security concerns were taken to an advanced level. During this period, Iran entered a difficult and long struggle, spending billions of dollars to prevent damage to its dominance especially in Lebanon and Syria and to prevent Western powers from settling in the region comfortably. With the increase in sanctions, economic difficulties began to manifest themselves more severely, and Iran's activities in Gaza and Lebanon became questionable among the people and in the protests that occurred. Indeed, in almost all of the major protests that started for different reasons in 2017, 2019, and 2022, slogans of "Neither Gaza Nor Lebanon, I Sacrifice My Life for Iran" were heard.

The rising power of the Quds Force with the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, and the "prestige" of its foreign operations in the country, further increased the IRGC's already existing power and its associated domination, which not only brought about discussions of usurpation of authority between institutions and individuals but also caused the formation of numerous gray areas.

The increase in the IRGC's effectiveness in the country during the 2000-2010 period was not limited to military areas but was also seen in the economy. The IRGC, which already had significant economic activities, became an enormous economic power in the 2000s, increasing its influence especially in sectors such as construction, energy, telecommunications, and banking. The Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, as the IRGC's construction arm, participated in major infrastructure projects and, in addition to many dam projects, undertook the task of developing phases 15 and 16 of the South Pars Gas Field in 2006. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, large state tenders and projects were given to companies belonging to the IRGC. Particularly Khatam al-Anbiya undertook important projects in the oil and gas sector and received billions of dollars in investment. The IRGC also took control of the Iran Telecommunications Company in 2009, becoming a monopoly in both the construction of the country's infrastructures, the energy sector, and the communication infrastructure.

In 2010 and after, in addition to the security issues mentioned above, the sanctions imposed on Iran by the US and the West further reinforced the IRGC's role in the economy. Within the framework of the "Resistance economy" policies declared by Khamenei in response to this pressure, the IRGC tried to develop strategies to increase Iran's self-sufficiency and also had a say in the making of the country's economic policies. With the implementation of the "maximum pressure" policy initiated by then-US President Trump in May 2018 by withdrawing his country from the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan (JCPOA), known as the nuclear agreement, the IRGC's economic influence increased even further, expanding its sectoral area.

The rising power of the IRGC, which claimed to organize and manage resistance in military and economic terms, inevitably reflected on the political field as well. As early as Khatami's first term, IRGC commanders took steps to carry out some important political interventions. The clearest example of this is the events that took place after the student protests in Iran in 1999. Following the protests, 24 senior commanders of the IRGC penned a "warning letter" addressed to President Mohammad Khatami. The letter claimed that Khatami's reformist policies threatened the country's stability and stated that if immediate action was not taken, the IRGC would intervene directly. With their threatening tone, the commanders went so far as to say that their patience had run out and that they would no longer show "tolerance" for what was happening. The letter also stated that Khatami needed to take action to suppress student protests, otherwise the IRGC would completely take over security in the capital and could use military force if necessary. This warning was seen by many as a show of force to control Khatami and the reform movement.

This letter and open threat also show that something was different in Iranian politics than it is today. Although the IRGC continued this stance during Hassan Rouhani's presidency between 2013-2021, thanks to its power, it did not need to write an open letter and exert pressure on the political will in this way. The most striking example of this power possessed by the IRGC during the Rouhani period was the leaked audio recording of then-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2021. In the audio recording, Zarif criticized the IRGC's influence on Iran's foreign policy and argued that especially Soleimani's intervention in foreign policy harmed Iran's diplomatic efforts and made nuclear negotiations difficult, saying that Soleimani's actions in Syria harmed Iran's long-term interests. In other words, the IRGC had become the one to have a say in the country's foreign policies on its own, without even feeling the need to consult with foreign affairs. It is seen that the IRGC, in the person of Soleimani, usurped authority against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over time, alongside the Artesh and the Ministry of Intelligence.

From the 2000s to today, many IRGC-origin figures such as Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Ahmad Vahidi, Ali Shamkhani, and Mohsen Rezaei have begun to play an active role in Iranian politics. At the point reached today, especially with the Ibrahim Raisi period, it is seen that almost every important institution, authority, and governorship is headed by IRGC-origin or closely related names. It is observed that almost no space is opened in politics for a civilian cadre similar to the first cadre that carried out the revolution, which prevents younger generations from growing up and coming to influential positions behind the first-period revolutionary cadre due to their aging, and prevents the established order from rejuvenating. This is one of the reasons why many figures, especially Rouhani, try to show their presence in the political arena by emphasizing their own backgrounds and the names they were educated by. Although some have hope about these structural problems during the period of Iran's new President Masoud Pezeshkian, it seems difficult to implement a comprehensive reform due to the system structure.

     2.2 Negative Consequences of Deterioration in Institutional Structure

It is clear that the deterioration of power asymmetry between institutions and conflicts and usurpation of authority will lead to serious vulnerabilities in a country's security and intelligence structure. These dynamics bring along various problems that threaten national security. This situation risks conflicting with general national interests by causing each institution to advocate policies and strategies that seem best from its own perspective. The deterioration of power asymmetry between institutions will cause unilateral processes to operate, which will increase the possibility of strategic surprise and the number of blind spots.

On the other hand, the deterioration of power asymmetry between institutions will primarily lead to a reduction in the diversity of strategic thinking. For example, the domination of a military institution like the IRGC over the system may strengthen the tendency to address all foreign policy problems with military solutions. Indeed, the objections of Zarif or Rouhani were directed at this one-sided perspective. This one-sided perspective may lead to the neglect of alternative strategies such as diplomacy or economic tools. As a result, the country's strategic flexibility will decrease, and its ability to respond to international crises will be limited.

Authority conflict, on the other hand, will lead to inefficiency and lack of coordination in decision-making processes. For example, the conflict of authority between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IRGC may prevent a consistent response in a foreign policy crisis, resulting in erosion of inter-institutional harmony. Consequently, the difficulty of making quick and effective decisions at critical moments will endanger national security. Especially during the Rouhani period, the differences in approach between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IRGC caused numerous inconsistencies.

Another significant vulnerability in Iran is the limitation of diversity and critical thinking in intelligence analyses. Such situations can lead to serious errors in national security policies and weaken the country's international position. Although many figures from Iran stated that Iran's deterrence was demonstrated after Operation Truthful Promise, the belief that deterrence would be re-established and that Israel would not make another move against Iranian territory lost its validity with the Haniyeh assassination. Iran, misassessing Israel's intentions and capabilities, failed to foresee Israel's subsequent actions.

Source: Prepared by IRAM experts.

     2.3 Analysis of the Ismail Haniyeh Assassination

Ismail Haniyeh, the Head of Hamas's Political Bureau, was assassinated in a strike carried out by Israel at midnight on Wednesday, July 31, in the building where he was spending the night in Tehran, where he was present for Pezeshkian's swearing-in ceremony. While Iranian authorities did not make an official statement about the incident in the first days, they claimed that the assassination was carried out by a missile fired from outside after the number of claims in the foreign press increased a few days after the incident. The New York Times, however, claimed that the assassination was carried out by detonating a bomb placed in Haniyeh's room shortly after the incident, and attributed the fact that no one other than Haniyeh himself and his bodyguard was harmed to this. Although Iranian authorities vehemently denied this claim, they could not present any clarifying evidence. The fact that the Iranian side did not present any concrete data, while all speculation could have been ended with a single photograph to be shared, increased doubts about the incident. If the New York Times' claim turns out to be true, it will not be difficult to understand the Iranian authorities' insistence on a missile. For this scenario is less humiliating for the Iranians than accepting that agents infiltrated the country and the system to carry out such an action.

At this point, the unit that showed vulnerability in preventing the assassination is Ansar al-Mahdi, which is affiliated with the IRGC Intelligence Organization and responsible for protecting VIP guests. It is estimated that approximately 10 to 15 thousand people serve in this unit, which was established after an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Rafsanjani in 1989. Apart from this, there is another unit in Iran known as Vali-ye Amr (Hefazat-e Sepah-e Bayt-e Rahbari or Sepah-e Hefazat-e Vali-ye Amr), which is responsible for protecting the Supreme Leader. It is estimated that a strict internal investigation has already begun in both of these units after the assassination.

In a scenario where the New York Times' claim is correct, the potential errors of the Ansar al-Mahdi unit in this scenario can be summarized under the following points:

1. Environmental Security Vulnerability: The ability to smuggle the bomb into the compound indicates a serious vulnerability in environmental security. This shows that entrances and exits and the supply chain are not sufficiently controlled.
2. Lack of Internal Threat Assessment: The placement of the bomb in the room proves that the possibility of an internal threat was not adequately evaluated. This raises questions about personnel reliability and indicates inadequacy in internal control mechanisms.
3. Technological Inadequacy: It is understood that technological security measures such as explosive detection systems and camera surveillance are inadequate or not used effectively.
4. Weakness in Intelligence Analysis: The failure to take seriously the conflict in the region and Israel's previously announced threat to carry out an assassination shows a weakness in intelligence analysis and risk assessment.
5. Security Procedures Being Routine and Predictable: The possibility that security procedures are routine and predictable may have facilitated the attackers' plans.
6. Lack of Coordination: Lack of coordination with other security units suggests the absence of a holistic security approach.
7. Physical Security Vulnerability: It is understood that the room where the VIP guest stayed was not physically secured with armored walls, safe rooms, and similar systems as expected.
8. Inadequate Immediate Response: The inability to intervene in the event during the time between the placement and detonation of the bomb shows a weak immediate response capacity. The fact that a pre-placed bomb could not be detected, and no intervention was made until it exploded is an indication of the weak immediate response capacity of the security units.
9. Counter-Intelligence Vulnerability: The inability to detect hostile intelligence activities reveals the inadequacy of counter-intelligence efforts.
10. Lack of Training and Preparation: It is understood that the personnel are not sufficiently trained and prepared against such high-profile threats.
11. Protocol Flexibility: It is among the possibilities that the VIP guest was allowed to deviate from security protocols or that standard security procedures were relaxed.
12. Risk Assessment Error: Failure to correctly assess the risks of a high-profile visit indicates a deficiency in the general risk analysis approach.

If the claim of the Iranian authorities turns out to be true, we can analyze the intelligence and security vulnerabilities shown by the Ansar al-Mahdi unit as follows:

1. Location Privacy Violation: The ability to detect the room where the VIP guest stayed from outside shows that location privacy could not be ensured and indicates the inadequacy of both physical and electronic counter-surveillance measures.
2. Lack of Environmental Security: The inability to provide adequate environmental security in the mountainous area proves that potential attack points were not identified, and precautions were not taken in advance.
3. Insufficient Risk Analysis: The inability to foresee that the mountainous area could be a suitable point for an attack reveals a deficiency in risk analysis and threat assessment.
4. Lack of Tactical Intelligence: The inability to detect the movements of enemy elements in the region indicates weak field intelligence.
5. Counter-Intelligence Vulnerability: The failure to prevent enemy intelligence activities is the result of insufficient counter-intelligence efforts.
6. Technological Inadequacy: The absence of technological infrastructure to detect and prevent missile threats indicates serious deficiencies in technological capacity.
7. Operational Security Violation: Information leakage about the location and movements of the VIP guest shows that operational security protocols have been violated.
8. Lack of Intelligence Analysis: The inability to foresee possible attack scenarios reveals a deficiency in intelligence analysis and scenario planning.
9. Coordination Deficiency: The lack of effective coordination between different security units shows the lack of an integrated security approach. This assassination and missile attack may have been carried out by a network that the IRGC was completely unaware of and that the Ministry of Intelligence detected and conducted counter-intelligence activities against. It is highly likely that at least one of the stages of smuggling the parts of this missile across the border, hiding it, transporting it unnoticed in Tehran's most elite neighborhoods, and placing and firing it on the mountainside has come under the radar of one of the institutions responsible for security. Under all circumstances, it is seen that there is a vulnerability in the higher institutions responsible for coordinating the intelligence coming from these institutions.
10. Absence of Deception and Misdirection Strategies: The failure to use deception tactics to conceal the real location of the VIP guest means there is a deficiency in passive defense strategies.
11. Physical Infrastructure Vulnerability: The vulnerability of the room where the VIP guest stayed against missile attacks reveals the inadequacy of physical security measures.

These vulnerabilities prove that the Ansar al-Mahdi unit has layered and serious deficiencies in its VIP protection duty. It is understood that the unit is unprepared against modern asymmetric threats and cannot go beyond traditional protection methods. However, Haniyeh was a name directly targeted by Israel. Considering all these, it is concluded that the relevant unit needs a comprehensive restructuring in the areas of risk assessment, technological infrastructure, intelligence analysis, and operational security.

3. Impact of Social Issues and Vulnerabilities on Security Matters in the Country

Iran faces numerous issues ranging from the housing crisis to employee rights. The existing economic burden has been further exacerbated by sanctions. People experiencing problems in many areas, from housing to food, see the established order as the source of the problem. This brings along threats such as social unrest and instability, radicalization and extremism, increased crime rates, internal migration and slum problems and infrastructure deficiencies, erosion of state legitimacy and trust, and risks of external intervention and manipulation. This situation creates a very suitable ground for hostile intelligence organizations. In other words, the pressures and sanctions against Iran open other doors for hostile organizations and expand their area of operation. This aspect of the pressure policy against Iran needs to be well understood.

The assessment of social problems in Iran in terms of intelligence and security vulnerabilities can be categorized as follows:

     3.1 Straining of Domestic Intelligence Capacity

As will be discussed in the following sections, increasing social unrest and anti-regime movements are overloading Iran's internal intelligence units. These units are forced to allocate more resources to monitor, analyze, and intervene in large-scale protests and opposition groups. This situation may lead to a reduction in resources allocated to other critical intelligence areas (e.g., external threats or economic intelligence). In other words, this situation weakens the country's ability to follow and analyze regional and global developments. Moreover, intense internal surveillance creates paranoia and distrust in society, making it more difficult to gather intelligence in the long term.

The increasing social unrest and anti-regime movements in Iran are seriously straining the country's internal intelligence units. This situation puts significant pressure on the intelligence creation process. The basic stages of the intelligence cycle - planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, distribution processes - cannot function optimally due to increasing internal threats. Especially in the collection and analysis stages, directing a large portion of resources to internal threats risks weakening external intelligence capacity. This situation may cause Iran to develop strategic blind spots in the international arena.

The complex intelligence structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is struggling to cope with these challenges. The lack of coordination between various intelligence and security units operating in the country - the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization, the Army Intelligence Organization, and others - makes it difficult to form an effective response to internal threats. Competition between these units and sometimes overlapping jurisdictions hinder the efficient use of resources and reduce the quality of intelligence analysis. Moreover, deficiencies in information sharing within this complex structure can lead to potential threats being overlooked or misinterpreted.

As a result, the straining of Iran's internal intelligence capacity deeply affects the country's security structure and intelligence activities. This situation not only remains an internal security issue but also has significant implications for the country's foreign policy, diplomatic relations, and regional strategies. How the Iranian administration will cope with these challenges and how it will reshape its intelligence structure is critical for the country's future stability and international position. In this context, Iran's success in conducting intelligence reform and establishing a balance between internal and external intelligence will be one of the key factors shaping the country's future. However, this is difficult in the current conjuncture.

     3.2 Facilitation of Infiltration by Hostile Intelligence Services

Economic difficulties and social discontent are making Iranian citizens targets for foreign intelligence services. Individuals experiencing financial difficulties or dissatisfied with the regime may become more open to sharing confidential information in exchange for financial incentives or political promises. This situation makes it easier for foreign services to find influence agents or establish intelligence networks within Iran. In other words, economic hardships leave many Iranians financially vulnerable. High inflation, unemployment, and declining living standards not only leave people in financial difficulty, but those who are extremely opposed to the regime also become targets of hostile services in a similar way. In this environment, it becomes easier for foreign intelligence services to find potential sources. In this case, agitation, manipulation, and recruitment activities become easier, and penetration is facilitated. Social discontent creates alienation from the regime, especially among the young and educated segment, which makes it easier for foreign services to find sympathizers and collaborators within Iran.

     3.3 Border Security Issues

Economic difficulties and social vulnerabilities are among the factors that make it difficult to control Iran's extensive borders. These difficulties and problems pave the way for people living in border regions and struggling with poverty to turn to smuggling activities, illegal migration movements, and potentially for terrorist elements to infiltrate the country. At this point, it should be remembered that many activities, including the Fakhrizadeh assassination, were carried out within Iran with equipment smuggled into Iran illegally. Nuclear documents taken out of the country by trucks also reveal a similar problem. One of the reasons for the tension between Kurds and Turks in West Azerbaijan province is the shares taken from smuggling. The biggest reason for this is that this province is among the poorest regions of the country.

     3.4 Pressure on Intelligence Personnel

The social and economic problems in Iran are creating an increasing pressure on the country's intelligence and security personnel. This situation not only affects operational effectiveness but also threatens institutional integrity and personnel loyalty. Economic difficulties directly affect the living standards of intelligence personnel. High inflation and declining purchasing power are making these once prestigious and secure professions increasingly less attractive. This situation leads to experienced personnel leaving the institution and talented young people not being drawn to this field, and the quality in these institutions is declining in parallel. Moreover, economic hardships and social pressure make intelligence personnel more vulnerable to corruption, which brings serious security risks such as the selling of confidential information, accepting bribes, or cooperation with organized crime groups.

Social unrest, vulnerabilities, and increasing reactions to the regime also affect the psychological state of intelligence personnel. As will be discussed in the next section, especially those working in internal intelligence units are seen as apparatuses of the oppressive regime by a large segment of society. This perception negatively affects the social life of the personnel and reduces their work motivation. Furthermore, some personnel may face situations where their own families and close circles participate in protests or oppose the regime, which can create serious conflicts between duty and personal loyalty.

     3.5 Iranians' Fear of Intelligence and Their Country's Institutions

No intelligence organization or security structure that does not draw strength from its people can conduct successful activities in the country. In Iran, the word "Ettelaat" (the colloquial short form of the intelligence organization's name) is a word that people mention with fear. Ettelaat is something to be feared for Iranians and a structure they definitely do not want to face. This situation brings along other problems such as difficulty in gathering intelligence, risk of radicalization, and openness to foreign influence operations.

Mohammad Reyshahri, the first intelligence minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, placed great importance on internal intelligence and activities towards opponents, and structured the organization accordingly. This is understandable within the war and revolution conditions of that day. Indeed, Iranian politics witnessed many attacks and assassinations during that period, and opponents carried out numerous attacks against the revolutionary cadre. There is an understanding inherited from those days in all institutions of Iranian intelligence. Similarly, a similar concern still continues among the people.

People's fear and hesitation make it difficult for intelligence institutions to collect accurate and timely information about internal threats. In Iran, people may hesitate to share even what they know for fear of something happening to them. Especially the urban population sees Ettelaat as a government apparatus trying to suppress the people rather than an institution that ensures the country's security, and this leads to the radicalization and underground movement of some segments. On the other hand, citizens who do not trust their own state and each other become more open to the influence operations of foreign intelligence services. A constant environment of fear and pressure causes talented individuals to leave the country, weakening the country's technological and scientific capacity and negatively affecting national security in the long term. Finally, in an overly suspicious environment, intelligence institutions may have to deal with numerous "false positive" warnings. Thus, it becomes difficult to focus on real threats, and resources are used inefficiently.

     3.6 Prevalence of Social Signaling and Status Indicators and the Vulnerabilities They Create

In Iran, people in various official positions, from the highest to the middle class, are eager to show themselves. In the literature, the terms "status indicators" and "social signaling" stand out among the concepts that explain the behaviors individuals display in society to differentiate themselves from others and display a certain status. These concepts refer to individuals displaying certain symbols or behaviors to show their social status, economic power, or social position. For example, using luxury products, displaying a certain lifestyle, or belonging to certain professional groups (or marrying someone belonging to these groups) are methods individuals use to show their social status.

In autocratic systems where power determines everything, some people want to stay close to power and get a share of this power, and individuals who reach these statuses want to show somehow that they have this power. For this reason, it can be easily understood who works for the state and who keeps their distance in Iran. At first glance, it is not difficult to understand who is associated with the state, who is a member of the Basij, or who is an opponent just from the looseness of the suit they wear, the style of the shirt, the shape of the beard, or the way the hair is combed. People try to show their loyalty to the revolution through a "dress code" that the revolution has. Similarly, some people within the system boast about the mark left on the forehead by the "mohr," the soil that Shiites use when praying and prostrating, and try to show the strength of their faith. It is even mentioned that there are people in Iran who try to leave marks by heating this "mohr" and pressing it to their foreheads. Finally, many people in the country can become Basij members just to take advantage of its benefits and gain personal interests. Although these people appear loyal to the revolution and the system on paper, they pose a risk to the system because they are essentially pursuing personal fortune.

4. Conclusion

Iran's intelligence and security vulnerabilities can be evaluated as a reflection of the multidimensional problems the country faces. Inter-institutional competition and authority conflicts, especially the increasing power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its domination over other institutions, seriously affect the effectiveness of intelligence activities. The expanding influence of the IRGC in the fields of economy and politics narrows the field of action of other institutions and causes a lack of coordination. These structural problems can lead to inconsistencies and strategic errors in Iran's security policies. Especially the "political purification" process carried out under the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei has increased the conflicts between institutions by leading to the exclusion of people who are seen as disloyal or oppositional from the system. The loss of balancing figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani has made the imbalance in the system even more pronounced.

Social vulnerabilities and economic difficulties strain Iran's intelligence capacity from another angle. Increasing internal unrest and anti-regime movements overload the resources of internal intelligence units and weaken defense against external threats. Economic difficulties make citizens targets for foreign intelligence services and increase the risk of finding potential collaborators within the country. This situation also leads to an increase in smuggling activities and weakening of border security. For example, materials entering Iran through these smuggling routes, as in the Fakhrizadeh assassination, can be used against the country. Additionally, the economic and psychological pressure on intelligence personnel threatens institutional integrity and personnel loyalty, increases the risk of corruption, and reduces intelligence quality.

The fear and distrust of Iranian society towards intelligence institutions constitute a security vulnerability in itself. People's hesitation to share information makes intelligence gathering processes difficult and prevents the timely detection of internal threats. On the other hand, the tendency of state institution employees to display their status endangers operational security and gives enemy intelligence services an advantage in target identification. This situation has facilitated Israel's establishment of a wide intelligence network within Iran. Various scandals and leaked audio recordings in recent years reveal the extent of conflicts between institutions and individuals in Iran. These internal conflicts and security vulnerabilities facilitate Israel's covert activities in Iran such as sabotage, removal of important documents from the country, and assassinations.

For all these reasons, the intelligence and security vulnerabilities that Iran faces are a reflection of the country's complex political, economic, and social problems. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires a comprehensive reform process and the re-establishment of inter-institutional balance. However, given the current structural problems and external pressures, this process seems difficult to achieve in the short term. Iran's capacity to cope with these challenges will be decisive for the country's future stability and international position. In this process, Iran may engage more with countries like Russia and China to close intelligence and security gaps. However, such collaborations risk bringing new dependencies and risks.