The combined Israeli and American campaign against Iran was, from the outset, shaped by the objective of regime change. The broader strategic aim has been to transform Iran into a state more closely aligned with the West by compelling it to abandon its nuclear program, limit its ballistic missile capabilities and sever or substantially weaken its ties to regional proxy networks. The military approach pursued toward this end rested on a relatively straightforward logic. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was identified as the system’s center of gravity, and it was assumed that the elimination of the senior leadership, including the Supreme Leader, could trigger a process of systemic collapse.

This logic was evident both during the twelve-day conflict of June 2025 and during the second campaign launched on 28 February 2026. In both cases, strikes focused heavily on the IRGC, command-and-control structures, and senior leadership figures, reflecting an effort to paralyze the regime’s decision-making capacity. During the second campaign, however, the target set expanded considerably. Beyond military and security institutions, numerous infrastructure facilities, logistics hubs, and critical economic assets came under attack, including air defense systems, radar networks, airports, air bases, oil storage facilities, refineries, petrochemical complexes, steel plants, power stations, universities, water purification plants and communications infrastructure, many of them dual-use facilities. The scope of these operations suggests an approach aimed not only at degrading Iran’s military capabilities but also at weakening the state structures and societal resilience that sustain the Islamic Republic.

Recent details emerging from within Israel regarding the timing of the campaign suggest, however, that the picture is more complicated than it initially appears. According to assessments reflected in some Israeli open sources, the second war had in fact been planned for the summer of 2026, on the grounds that Iran’s missile infrastructure needed time to be rebuilt; the operation was reportedly brought forward when the popular protests of December 2025 and their suppression in January 2026 were read as a window of opportunity. If this claim is accurate, the campaign that began on 28 February was not a premeditated war but one that developed under conditions of time pressure and uncertainty. Moreover, the political and military echelons appear to have diverged over its objectives. While the political leadership set the maximal goal of regime change from the outset, the military establishment focused more on eroding Iran’s capabilities and preparing the conditions for an eventual political transformation.

The Limits of Decapitation

The central weakness of this calculus, championed for years by Israel’s political leadership and later embraced by Washington, lies in its reading of Iran itself. It underestimates several factors that have historically contributed to the resilience of the Islamic Republic: the enduring strength of Iranian nationalism; the distinction many Iranians draw between opposition to the government and opposition to the state; the extent to which narratives of Karbala and martyrdom continue to serve as sources of political cohesion, particularly among conservative constituencies; and the fact that Iranian decision-makers had long anticipated the possibility of such a confrontation and prepared accordingly.

Observers familiar with Iran have long noted that, in a political culture where sacrifice in the face of a stronger adversary can generate legitimacy rather than undermine it, slain commanders and targeted leaders are often transformed into symbols of resistance. Likewise, attacks on infrastructure, the encouragement of separatism among minority groups, and threats aimed at destroying the country’s civilization have tended to provoke broad nationalist reactions extending well beyond supporters of the Islamic Republic and encompassing segments of society otherwise critical of the regime.

The result is what might be described as a tactical victory trap. Military superiority has not translated into a political outcome, and operational success has yet to produce a corresponding strategic gain. Rather than generating the fragmentation anticipated by its architects, the campaign has thus far reinforced some of the very dynamics that contribute to the system’s resilience.

This reality is particularly relevant to the question of succession. Within this context, Mojtaba Khamenei has emerged as a significant figure. Owing to his influence within the IRGC, his ties to the political establishment, and around twenty-five years of experience in state affairs at his father’s side, he is widely viewed as one of the few individuals capable of preserving elite cohesion during a period of transition. Whatever the debates surrounding his religious credentials, his ability to prevent political and military fragmentation makes him an important factor in the succession equation.

Therefore, Mojtaba Khamenei is a potential target from Israel’s perspective.  A strategy centered on leadership decapitation assumes that the removal of senior figures will generate instability and fragmentation. The emergence of a leader capable of reconstituting authority and restoring cohesion would therefore undermine the very logic upon which such a strategy rests. To ensure that the intended divisions deepen and that the decapitation strategy to produce results, no strong leader capable of reuniting the system must be allowed to emerge.

Taken together, these developments suggest that Iran is fighting two distinct wars. The first is the military confrontation itself, in which the survival of the state structure has thus far prevented the strategic collapse anticipated by its adversaries. The second, and ultimately more consequential, war will begin once the fighting ends. Shaped by the economic, social, and institutional consequences of damaged infrastructure, this phase will present a far more complex challenge. Iran’s decisive test, therefore, may not lie on the battlefield but in its ability to manage the political, economic, and social pressures that emerge in the aftermath of the conflict.

The Search for a Postwar Strategy

Israel’s security establishment is increasingly aware of the limits of military force as a tool of political transformation. The assessment that the Islamic Republic cannot be toppled through bombardment alone has gained broad acceptance, shifting the debate toward a different question: what strategy should follow once the military campaign ends? Significantly, these discussions do not suggest that the objective of regime change has been abandoned. Rather, they reflect an ongoing search for alternative means of achieving it.

One school of thought, particularly influential within parts of the intelligence community, maintains that regime change remains an attainable objective in the near term. Its central assumption is that a large segment of Iranian society, burdened by economic hardship and alienated from the regime, remains politically inactive primarily out of fear. According to this view, the Islamic Republic has spent decades cultivating an image of omnipotence and invulnerability. The first task, therefore, is to erode that image and demonstrate that the state apparatus is neither all-powerful nor immune to penetration.

The circulation of footage showing intelligence operatives moving freely inside Iran and the publicization of strikes against security facilities can be understood within this framework. Increasingly, however, influence operations appear to be complementing, or even replacing, more traditional coercive methods. Rather than physically eliminating senior officials, some assessments suggest that exposing compromising information and damaging reputations may prove both less costly and more effective. Such efforts are accompanied by campaigns conducted through fake accounts, AI-generated personas, and other instruments of information warfare.

The attempts to elevate Reza Pahlavi as a political alternative before the war reflected a similar logic. Although that effort has become less visible as the conflict has unfolded, comparable initiatives built around Pahlavi or other opposition figures remain possible. The central assumption underpinning this approach is that if Iran is denied economic breathing space through a negotiated settlement and existing pressure is maintained, the regime could enter a serious process of erosion by the end of 2026. In this reading, military campaigns are not decisive events in themselves but intermediate stages in a longer process designed to weaken the system from within.

A second school of thought offers a far more cautious assessment. Its proponents argue that regime change should not be treated as either a policy objective or a realistic expectation. In their view, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to preserve institutional continuity despite severe shocks to its leadership and command structure. They also question the assumption that economic pressure will inevitably lead either to collapse or capitulation, noting that the regime perceives the current confrontation as existential and is therefore prepared to absorb exceptionally high costs.

This perspective is equally skeptical of the notion that political transformation can be engineered from abroad. It warns against investing excessive hope in exiled opposition groups and argues that meaningful change will occur only if a broad-based coalition emerges from within Iranian society itself. Some proponents go further, suggesting that overt foreign-backed influence campaigns have often been counterproductive, reinforcing the regime’s narrative that external powers seek to impose a puppet government on Iran.

From this perspective, basing nuclear policy on the expectation of regime change is strategically unsound. Even a partial political settlement should therefore be welcomed if it constrains Iran’s nuclear program and contributes to regional stability. Rather than pursuing the ambitious objective of transforming the regime, policy should focus on more limited and achievable goals.

Yet despite their differences, the two schools converge on one important point. Both recognize that the military campaign alone is unlikely to produce the desired political outcome. The challenge is increasingly being redefined as a long-term struggle that combines military, economic, political, covert, and informational instruments. Regime change, if it comes at all, is now widely understood as a process that must ultimately emerge from within Iran; the role of external actors is limited to shaping the environment in which such a process might unfold.

This logic underpins growing interest in measures such as tools for circumventing internet restrictions, financial support for striking workers and protesters, assistance to civil society organizations and cyber and cognitive operations designed to weaken the security apparatus during future waves of unrest. Continued covert efforts to delay the reconstruction of Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities can be understood within the same framework.

The implication is clear. Even if a ceasefire is consolidated, negotiations advance, and the war formally ends, pressure on Iran is unlikely to cease. The military campaign should be understood as only one phase of a broader strategy. What follows is likely to be a more protracted contest fought through economic pressure, covert action, information operations, and political influence. In this sense, the decisive arena may not be the battlefield but the postwar environment itself.

Yet success remains far from guaranteed, a reality increasingly acknowledged within Israel. The same assumptions that shaped the initial strategy continue to pose risks. Economic hardship and social pressure may generate unrest, but they may also strengthen the security apparatus and reinforce nationalist sentiment. Any social unrest that may arise from now on is likely to be suppressed as harshly as possible. A society that has repeatedly confounded outside expectations may do so again. Ultimately, the fate of the Islamic Republic will be determined not by military superiority alone but by the outcome of this longer and more uncertain struggle. It is precisely there that Israel has now turned all of its attention.