On September 16, 2025, Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia. He was joined by senior officials, including Deputy Chair for Foreign Policy Ali Bagheri Kani and Deputy Foreign Minister for Persian Gulf Affairs Mohammad Ali Bek.

In Riyadh, Larijani held separate meetings with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman. According to the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), discussions with the Crown Prince centered on “bilateral relations and regional developments.”

Following his engagements, Larijani stated that the talks had covered regional security, the strategic challenges facing the Islamic world, bilateral economic relations, and defense cooperation. He underscored the importance of addressing trade barriers, expanding joint investment opportunities, and institutionalizing mechanisms for defense collaboration. Larijani further noted that expert-level working groups would be established to carry these efforts forward.

Why Now and Why It Matters?

The visit unfolded at a moment of unusual regional sensitivity. In bilateral terms, it built directly on Khalid bin Salman’s April 2025 trip to Tehran, reinforcing continuity in the diplomatic thaw launched by the China-brokered resumption of ties in March 2023 after a seven-year rupture. By sending Ali Larijani –an experienced insider with strong ties to both the Supreme Leader and Iran’s foreign-policy establishment– Tehran signaled that normalization with Riyadh remains a strategic priority rather than a tactical gesture.

The regional backdrop magnified the visit’s importance. Larijani’s Riyadh meetings occurred just days after Israel’s September 9 strike on Doha and immediately following the joint Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)–Arab League emergency summit convened in the Qatari capital on September 15. The sequencing underscored that the trip was calibrated not only to advance bilateral cooperation but also to situate Iran–Saudi engagement within a wider regional security architecture.

Larijani’s characterization of Israel as a “reckless actor” destabilizing the Middle East, coupled with his suggestion that Arab states are gravitating toward a more unified strategic posture, illustrates Tehran’s effort to capitalize on Israeli escalation. By framing convergence with Riyadh as part of a collective Arab and Islamic response to Israel, Iran seeks to broaden the normalization process beyond narrow transactionalism, embedding it instead in a narrative of shared regional security concerns.

 The Hezbollah Factor

Iranian media highlighted the Lebanon–Hezbollah file as a central undercurrent of Larijani’s visit. Hezbollah, long regarded in Tehran as the backbone of its deterrence posture against Israel, occupies a pivotal place in Iran’s regional security architecture. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has traditionally supported international efforts –particularly since 2005– to disarm Hezbollah, viewing the group as a principal vector of Iranian influence in Lebanon.

From Tehran’s perspective, Israel’s recent strikes on Gaza and Qatar provide a moment for Riyadh to recalibrate. Iranian officials argue that these attacks reinforce the claim that “Israel constitutes the primary threat to regional stability.” By this logic, weakening Hezbollah would not only destabilize Lebanon but also erode the broader balance of deterrence across the region, ultimately undermining Gulf security itself.

Larijani’s mission appears to have included efforts to persuade Saudi counterparts that Hezbollah’s disarmament would have negative security implications for Riyadh as well. Israeli rhetoric about a “Nile-to-Euphrates” sphere of influence –sometimes interpreted as encompassing Saudi territory– was cited as evidence of the risks of weakening resistance actors.

For Tehran, Hezbollah’s continued strength is indispensable to both preserving Lebanon’s equilibrium and sustaining the deterrence capacity of the “axis of resistance.” Iranian elites also warn that disarming Hezbollah could produce a domino effect, weakening allied militias in Iraq and diminishing the resilience of Iran’s regional network at a time when the prospect of a wider conflict with Israel looms.

Conclusion

Larijani’s Riyadh mission marks both a milestone and a reminder of enduring limits. The talks underscored a shared interest in institutionalizing trade, investment, and security coordination, while also revealing Tehran’s tactical effort to exploit Israel’s regional escalation as political space for closer engagement with Saudi Arabia. Yet formidable structural impediments remain: Riyadh’s entrenched security partnership with Washington and the persistence of mutual mistrust constrain the scope for any genuine strategic realignment.

Looking ahead, the durability of the détente will be tested across three pressure points. In Lebanon, Riyadh’s stance on U.S. and Israeli calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament will signal the depth of Saudi flexibility in accommodating Tehran’s red lines. In Yemen, despite partial de-escalation, diverging strategic interests continue to represent a structural fault line. And in the event of renewed Iran–Israel escalation, Saudi Arabia’s positioning will reveal whether the rapprochement can withstand external shocks.

In this light, while limited and transactional cooperation mechanisms may emerge, a deeper and more enduring strategic alignment between Iran and Saudi Arabia remains improbable in the near term. The trajectory of their engagement will likely be defined less by formal declarations than by how each manages crises as they unfold.